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Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments

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Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments

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Executive Summary

There is a widespread perception that it is becoming increasingly dangerous for humanitarian workers to provide assistance in conflict and post-conflict settings. In some cases this may be due to their proximity to and cooperation with traditional military forces operating in these zones. In other cases it may be due to misperceptions by belligerents about the relationships between military and humanitarian actors. In still other cases due to the well-publicized success that belligerents' attacks have had in disrupting the stabilization and reconstruction processes in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Diversity of opinion, policy, motivation and operational practice among humanitarian actors makes it impossible to settle on a single, unified course of action to remedy this situation. However, familiarity and discussion among organizations improves their appreciation of each other's activities, thus enhancing the ultimate goal of providing humanitarian assistance to civilian populations living in insecure environments.

Against this backdrop, workshop participants developed the following findings and recommendations:

- Major differences exist in the desired relationships between non-governmental organizations/international organizations (NGO/IOs) and the military. The military generally wants closer cooperation, while NGO/IOs want clearly defined roles and obvious demarcations between different humanitarian and military organizations/operations.

- There is a critical need for clear, widely accepted operational definitions for commonly used terms such as "humanitarian space," "humanitarian actors" and "security."

- Dialogue among actors in the field of humanitarian assistance is critical, as it increases familiarity and understanding between organizations and provides a forum in which to craft and agree on acceptable definitions.

- Government policymakers need to establish a regular process for integrating NGO/IO input into plans for the delivery of humanitarian assistance pre-, during and post-conflict.

- The DoD should incorporate existing operational guidelines for humanitarian assistance, such as those developed by UNOCHA, into future military operations.

Introduction

This is the final report summarizing discussions at the workshop on "Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments." It details challenges and issues faced by NGO/IOs, armed forces, and governments as they attempt to operate along side each other in stabilization and reconstruction operations in conflict and post-conflict zones.

The workshop was held on 13-14 January 2005 with representatives from five non-governmental humanitarian organizations, two international organizations, three academic institutions and four US Government agencies and departments. There were a total of 30 participants from these various organizations. The goal was to keep the overall group small enough to facilitate frank discussions.

California State University Monterey Bay, the Center for Humanitarian Cooperation, the International Medical Corps, the International Rescue Committee, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and the Naval Postgraduate School sponsored the workshop. It was hosted by the United States Institute of Peace (1200 17th Street, NW, Washington, DC.) The conference was funded by the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School and by the US Institute of Peace.

The workshop was developed by California State University Monterey Bay, the Monterey Institute for International Studies and the Naval Postgraduate School as a way for NGO/IO actors and their government counterparts involved in complex humanitarian emergencies to identify common concerns and propose ways of dealing with them. The three educational institutions also plan to develop new education and training programs that will be of use to NGO/IO staff involved in these issues.

Structure of the Report

This report is divided into four major sections: survey discussion and results, day one discussions and conclusions, day two breakout group discussions and presentations, and conclusions and recommendations. Some topics and issues appear frequently. This is because the survey, the workshop discussions and the breakout groups focused on a set of commonly defined key issues. Many of these issues were identified and reviewed by different groups or within each activity.

Survey Description and Results[1]

In preparation for the workshop, Professors Karen Guttieri of the Naval Postgraduate School and Miguel Tirado of California State University Monterey Bay prepared a survey to identify and map the relationships between actors involved in providing humanitarian assistance in conflict and post-conflict settings (See Appendix II: Workshop Survey). The survey was distributed to the non-governmental organizations, international organizations and governmental, military and academic professionals who were invited to participate in the workshop discussions. Of the 22 surveys distributed, 20 were returned. This small survey was not intended as a scientific instrument, but its results were used as a point of departure for discussions between workshop participants.

The survey examined the most pressing challenges/concerns facing organizations in post-conflict and relief settings. Three challenges were at the top of nearly every response:

- Security for personnel
- Information sharing
- Local public awareness

In discussing the security challenges facing personnel, respondents voiced concern over the "blurring of lines" between humanitarian actors on the one hand and political and military actors on the other. The identity and relationships between actors in conflict and post-conflict settings can quite literally mean life or death for the individuals involved on the ground. Many NGO/IOs that specialize in providing aid in such environments frequently depend on images of neutrality and impartiality to do so. If interaction with military forces compromises this image of neutrality, many respondents believe it is possible that they will no longer be viewed as independent actors, thus becoming legitimate targets in the eyes of some combatants. This perception has been highlighted by recent attacks against United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and by the assassination of Margaret Hassan, director of Care International's operations in Iraq.

[1] This section on survey results draws heavily from a paper entitled "Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments: Response to a Survey" presented by Dr. Karen Guttieri (Guttieri@nps.edu) of the Naval Postgraduate School at the conference.

It is noteworthy that communications and information sharing were prominent concerns of almost everyone who responded to the survey. One participant remarked that "better clarity and [a] more systematic and focused effort to communicate purpose by all organizations operating in an emergency can help improve collaboration without abrogating the organizations' key principles or protocols."

Other prominently mentioned concerns were staff recruiting and training, donor issues (particularly US Government expectations), program monitoring and evaluation, and logistical and communications barriers to cooperation.

Seeking to better understand relationships between organizations in the field, the survey asked participants to identify their current levels of interaction with other types of actors as well as their desired levels of such interaction with these actors.

It appears from the responses that NGO workers are encountering the military more frequently and intimately than desired, while the military finds itself expected to perform humanitarian and reconstruction activities that it is unprepared for and that it would rather pass on to other organizations.

Participants were asked to provide their responses according to the following hierarchical range of interactions:

(SEE NEXT PAGE)

Type of Interaction	Description
Conflictive	Unproductive disputes
Dismissive	The other party or actor discounts your role
Awareness	Cognizant of each other's presence in field
Familiarity	Knowledgeable of the others' activities and methods
Boundary setting	Mutually clarify parameters of operation to avoid disruption of one another's missions
Cooperative	Mutual accommodation for separate missions, Including information exchange
Collaborative	Distinct operating teams / work toward common outcome based on shared situational understanding
Partnering	Mix operational units / work toward a common goal

Survey respondents included nine non-governmental organizations. They were asked to describe the character and quality of their interactions with other organizations in the field of humanitarian assistance as well as what type of interaction they desire (shown in the middle column in brackets).

They responded as follows:

NGO Interactions

With Whom	Current Interaction [Desired Interaction]	Quality
IO	Collaborative-partnering	High
Local NGO	Cooperative	High
Int'l NGO	Cooperative [collaborative]	Medium
Local Authorities	Boundary setting [cooperative]	Medium
Military	Boundary setting	Low-Medium
Contractors	Familiarity [cooperative]	Low

In contrast, US Government and military responses were more sanguine, as follows:

US Government and Military Interactions

With Whom	Current Interaction [Desired Interaction]	Quality
IO	Cooperative-partnering	Medium-High
Local NGO	Cooperative	Medium
Int'l NGO	Cooperative	Medium-Low
Local Authorities	Cooperative	Medium
Contractors	Familiarity – cooperative	Medium

Many NGO/IOs noted how critical host country perceptions are to the success of their work. "Without strong local bonds and buy-in from the community, our work is not tenable," wrote one participant. "Security is a major concern when perception is incorrect," wrote another. One participant wrote, "The military is dismissive of NGOs and [is] delving ever deeper into humanitarian programming. The US Government is obsessed with owning the NGOs through rhetoric ('force multipliers'), actions (contracts vs. grants…), and sanctions (prohibiting even emergency humanitarian assistance through OFAC licensing)."

For its part, respondents from the US Department of Defense highlighted a difference between conflict and permissive environments. Within conflict zones, they expressed a desire to transition away from humanitarian operations as soon as other organizations are in a position to lead humanitarian activities. Within permissive environments, respondents indicated that DoD's preferred role depends largely on a host nation's desires and approval, as its stated goal is to participate/operate only "with the approval of host nation authorities."

Civilian government agencies likewise seek to "work closely with and empower, if possible, local communities." The need to manage tensions between humanitarian workers and armed forces conducting peacekeeping duties was noted by many government officials, highlighting a major challenge faced in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Workshop Discussions: Day One

The workshop opened with a short presentation of the survey results described above. Common trends were highlighted, as were the differences in approaches, preferences and perspectives of the various actors involved in delivering humanitarian assistance. Broadly speaking, the subsequent discussion fell into five categories.

Members of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Australian military officers

Photo: Australian Government Department of Defence

I. Relationships

Workshop discussions largely focused on the relationships among actors providing humanitarian assistance in conflict and post-conflict settings, namely NGOs, IOs and armed forces. While these actors come into frequent contact with one another, there are significant differences in their fundamental operational guidelines, mandates and objectives. These differences often generate misperceptions and confusion among actors in the field, and pose major challenges to the goals of stabilization and reconstruction. (It is important to note that, even within a particular organizational category (NGOs, for example), there are vast differences in perspective and delivery methods.)

An important operational weakness that was immediately recognized is the need for a clear definition of roles for the various actors involved as well as a clear definition of "humanitarian assistance" (as opposed to humanitarian relief, development, etc.). Many noted that "such definitions are critical if we are to

have a comprehensive understanding of who is doing what, how, and for what reasons."

Another major problem that was addressed at the outset is the lack of interaction/communication between the various actors involved in providing humanitarian assistance prior to implementation in the field. This lack of prior communication, coupled with the lack of clear understanding of operational roles cited above, frequently results in situations in which members of the various organizations meet for the first time on the ground, "learning while doing" in the process of administering aid.

It was pointed out that this is not necessarily bad, and that "success ultimately depends on the personality and experience of the operators on the ground." Further, it was noted that increased familiarity might not necessarily create a smoother working relationship.

The discussion on interaction and communication then moved to the desirability of enhanced interaction, and perhaps even collaboration, with some promoting the possibility of joint training exercises taking place prior to deployment. While there was a diverse range of opinion on this issue, the discussion generally confirmed the findings of the survey: the military wants more cooperation with NGO/IOs, while the NGO/IOs want clearly defined roles with distinct operations for the separate actors in the field. Highlighting the diversity of the group, some NGO/IOs said that they would like increased interaction with military forces, while others declined to consider such a possibility even if the military force was part of a UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operation. One participant asked, "Why should there be common operations or training exercises when the ultimate objectives of our organizations are different?"

At this point participants identified a critical difference in functional versus motivational relationships. While the discussions had previously focused on the functional relationships between actors involved in humanitarian actions, it was noted that there are also major differences in what motivates different actors to become involved in specific complex humanitarian emergencies. Put simply, "Why are these actors involved in providing humanitarian assistance in particular settings?"

A significant motivational factor causing military forces to get involved in humanitarian assistance is the legal requirement for occupying forces to provide for civilian populations living in conflict zones, as outlined in International Humanitarian Law. Despite this requirement, there are often major gaps in the

ability of military forces to provide for civilians. Another motivational factor for military forces is the belief that humanitarian assistance enhances force protection and helps to win the "hearts and minds" of the people. In either case, today's post-conflict requirements extend beyond providing food and medical care. External actors are expected to assist in transitions to democracy, manage prison and legal systems, promote economic development, and create an active, effective civil society. NGO/IOs usually play lead roles in filling these gaps—provided they can safely operate within the territory in question.

At this point in the discussion it was again noted that there is a need for clearly defined roles for all actors, and that these definitions need to include pre-, during and post-conflict activities. It was generally agreed that such definitions are critical to the ability to effectively provide assistance.

Many participants agreed with the statement that "the crux of managing civil-military relations is to manage expectations."

Related to this, several participants noted that within NGO/IOs there is frequently a disconnect between senior management and operators in the field. This disconnect can take many forms, but ultimately managers have to understand the realities of the situation on the ground and be prepared to deal with them effectively.

It was also noted that collaboration can include discussion and dialogue, meaning that actors can agree to disagree. "Democracy, for example," noted one participant, "is collaboration, but doesn't necessarily mean that we like each other."

Another participant noted that it is important to recognize that relationships, interests, governments, and situations on the ground can change. Thus, participants agreed that it is critical to continue and enhance dialogue among the actors so that everyone has a sense of what changes are taking place and how the various organizations can adapt in order to best accomplish their goals. Additionally, stated one participant, "We have to accept that we do not always get what we want." Different organizations have different mandates, and "we all have to fulfill our obligations regardless of what we would *like* to do, or *how* we would like to do it."

Confirming and expanding on the survey responses, some NGO/IO participants expressed concern about working with the US military now that the US is so focused on the Global War on Terror. To some NGO/IO participants, this focus

casts the US in the role of a belligerent. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, both in policy and on the ground in operational settings, some NGOs believed that collaboration could easily lead to guilt by association and thus pose a significant security threat. Essentially, some NGO participants believed that their image of neutrality could be damaged.

In summary, it is clear that well-defined relationships between actors engaged in humanitarian actions are critical to successfully providing for civilian populations living in conflict zones. However, it is equally clear that there is such a broad range of opinions and policy positions on acceptable forms of interaction between actors that it is impossible to make definitive statements about the current status of relations, let alone broad recommendations for the future.

The International Medical Corps providing humanitarian assistance in Macedonia, 1999

Photo: International Medical Corps/Danny Hoffman

II. Humanitarian Space

Drawing directly from a question in the survey, the basic concept of *humanitarian space* was a central theme of workshop discussions. This issue came up repeatedly. Workshop participants generally defined humanitarian space as a "safe and secure environment in which to provide impartial assistance and protection," while noting that such spaces are perceived to be increasingly unsafe. NGO participants consider impartiality, neutrality, non-discrimination and independence from political and military organizations essential to maintaining security. However, this model may not be holding. As one participant expressed, NGOs have themselves become prime targets due to their proximity to the conflict.

Another aspect of the discussions focused on the issue of neutrality and whether NGO/IOs can truly claim to be neutral. It was pointed out that when a government invites an NGO/IO into a country, it has a purpose for doing so--and this purpose is political. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban used external NGOs as a "force multiplier," relying on them to provide for the basic needs of the population, thus allowing the Taliban itself to focus on specific goals, such as the implementation of Islamic Law.

Similarly, one participant asked about the ability of local NGOs to be neutral in post-conflict environments. Another responded, "No, local NGOs cannot be

neutral in such situations, but at the same time they best know how to proceed within that particular society. Thus their participation can greatly enhance humanitarian efforts."

States have a sovereign duty to meet the humanitarian needs of their populations, and occupying forces have a similar legal duty to meet the needs of local populations. The nations of the world, noted one NGO representative, have come up with these mandates, which justify the existence and operations of (at least some) humanitarian organizations.

In response, another participant commented that "NGOs are established around a series of values; thus they are not neutral—which should be viewed as a good thing." The important factor is the impact of NGO/IO activities on the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance (i.e., on the populace in need) not on the interests of particular political powers.

Many NGO representatives acknowledged that while they have their own particular agendas, they do not consider themselves to be "partisan." One NGO representative noted that "My organization gets funding from so many sources that it does not consider itself to be promoting the specific policy goal of any one donor." Instead, it is doing what it considers to be "good work," providing for the basic needs of civilian populations. By some definitions this may not make them neutral, but it does not make them bad. "Intent," noted one participant, "does matter."

This was countered with the argument that what may be considered a neutral act by one could be viewed as a threat by another. For example, even something as seemingly impartial and innocent as a census can pose a real threat for a particular demographic group. Further, many NGO/IOs do what they think is right without consulting the local communities in which they are operating.

"Our organizations are the people in them," one participant asserted, "and that generally means that they are white, Christian, alcohol-drinking, sexually active males, a group clearly seen as a threat in some societies." The participant went on to state that the obvious solution is to incorporate more locals into multi-national NGOs—at all levels of implementation, from managing and implementing programs on the ground to executive decision making in senior management. This would help improve multinational NGO/IOs' image of neutrality, which in turn could help with the growing security challenges they face.

In response, another participant countered that in some cases the threat comes not from the nature of the humanitarian organizations, but from the recipient societies themselves. In some societies, the participant asserted, all outsiders are viewed suspiciously, regardless of their demographic make up, activities, or ultimate goals.

Again, the importance of having clear role definitions was raised. In many instances, argued one participant, "humanitarian assistance" is used much too broadly. There are real differences between humanitarian assistance, relief and development, and these differences have to be recognized and taken into account.

Further, NGO/IOs with different missions face different security challenges. For example, organizations that address immediate humanitarian assistance face different challenges from those faced by organizations focused on shaping society. The timelines that NGO/IOs with varying roles work under also have a big impact on the kinds of difficulties they face.

Humanitarian assistance is a "growth industry," with more organizations and individuals involved in providing humanitarian assistance in more locations around the world than at any time in history. Thus, with more providers on the ground, it is natural there will be an increase in the number of threats or attacks made against them. Despite this trend, however, participants felt that the increased threat levels are real, pointing to tactics successfully used by insurgents in Iraq spreading to other conflict zones, such as Colombia and parts of Africa.

Traffic control near Mosul, Iraq

Photo: US Department of Defense

III. Establishing a Secure Environment

At times, discussions about humanitarian space blended into broader discussions about general security, with clear differences as to how civilian and military participants define "secure environments" in complex humanitarian emergencies. Discussions confirmed the survey findings that military actors tend to place more emphasis on "national" security, "public" security and force protection, while NGO/IOs tend to place more emphasis on "human" or noncombatant security--on secure environments in which their beneficiaries can access humanitarian services and in which their personnel can safely administer aid.

The discussion began with the assertion that the military's role in an insecure environment is to provide the security necessary for the society to rebuild. "This is what people expect of them, and this, not humanitarian assistance," asserted one participant, "is what they (military forces) should focus on." It was pointed out that there is a "Catch-22": security is difficult to achieve without at least some progress in reconstruction, yet reconstruction depends on security for success.

It was again suggested, in response, that "It comes down to managing expectations." What is meant by security? Is it 100 percent security, 100 percent of the time? Is it quick reactions to security threats, or something else? One clear challenge in reaching group consensus on this issue is that there are so many levels of conflict, from macro to micro, some requiring military forces, others police forces.

There was general agreement, however, that the first few months of post-conflict reconstruction are critical. "The point of viable peace," suggested one participant, "is (within) the first three months of reconstruction." After that point, recurring violence becomes increasingly likely.

The issue of conflict prevention was raised as well. Stability and reconstruction efforts do not have to wait until after hostilities have broken out. They can, and should, be employed before a conflict begins, one participant stressed. Indeed, "War begins when diplomacy fails," voiced another.

The need for clear definitions and roles was emphasized again and again.

There are significant differences in perceptions regarding security, and different mechanisms employed to achieve it. One participant cited a recent UN report in which researchers asked UN employees working in Afghanistan to identify the regions in the country they considered insecure. Their perceptions of insecurity were compared with responses from indigenous Afghans, and were found to be diametrically opposed. The regions that the UN employees considered unsafe were regarded as secure by the local populations, while locals identified regions considered safest by the UN employees as the most dangerous.

It was noted that NGO/IOs depend on images of neutrality, impartiality and transparency in the minds of local populations to ensure their security. Military forces operate entirely differently, depending on images of power and strength to deter potential threats. The challenge, according to some, is integrating these two radically different systems into one operational mission with a common objective but different operational guidelines.

One participant expressed the opinion that if local populations are safe, NGO/IOs on the ground will be safe as well. A major challenge here is that there are often more than two sides to a conflict; and in some cases there are many different parties involved, each with different goals, guidelines, mandates and perceptions of security and neutrality.

Again, the changing nature of US foreign policy as a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and recent events in Iraq was noted. Within the US Government there is an increasing awareness and acceptance of the idea that in conflict zones success is about more than winning the war; it is also about winning the peace. There is growing recognition that the larger battle is for "hearts and minds," resulting in a greater emphasis being placed on "human security," stabilization and reconstruction. The battleground is becoming increasingly viewed as psychological rather than physical. At the same time, one participant noted, physical-security voids in some regions necessitate a strong military presence before such psychological and humanitarian aid can be delivered.

This poses a huge challenge because military personnel are generally not trained for such missions. They are frequently assigned such tasks simply because they have the funding and technical capability to carry them out, and because civilian policymakers do not know what other government agency to turn to. "This is not," one participant suggested, "(just) a problem within the US military. It is a problem within policymaking circles of the US Government."

The US military has the capability to provide significant humanitarian assistance in the face of complex humanitarian emergencies

Photo: US Department of Defense

IV. Providing Assistance

Despite reluctance on the part of the military to get involved in providing humanitarian assistance, the reality is that when it comes to actually delivering aid, the military is much better equipped than NGO/IOs. As one participant put it, NGOs simply cannot mobilize aid on the same scale as the military.

Specifically, the military's command of communications, logistics and transportation were cited as critical to its ability to provide timely, large-scale humanitarian assistance.

Adding to this, one participant noted that, "given the power and funding of the US military, it is quite likely that it will be involved in providing humanitarian assistance far into the future." Therefore, the participant suggested, "it is important to have increased education, communication and potential collaboration between the military and NGOs prior to future deployments."

Supporting the suggestion that there should be increased cooperation between NGO/IOs and the military, another participant asserted that clear understandings are needed of who can and will do what, and systems need to be in place to respond to humanitarian emergencies. "How often does the message have to be repeated and the lessons re-learned?" the participant asked. "A process has to be established and systematized, a system that we got close to in Bosnia when there was a UN advisor involved in military trainings." Continuing this theme, another participant agreed that "Just-in-time training is no good. We need more interagency cooperation. The military can do ad hoc (humanitarian response) all right because of its infrastructure and well-developed institutions, but most NGOs simply cannot." "Ad hockery," noted another, "leads to reaction rather than proactive planning."

In response, another participant noted that many NGO/IOs are becoming increasingly well organized and prepared for humanitarian crises.

A major problem for both military and governmental agencies, one participant mentioned, is a tendency on the part of US policymakers to anticipate and plan around "best possible" scenarios where, in fact, situations are often far more challenging.

Most militaries place a high priority on training personnel in order to assure a high performance standard. NGO/IOs, it was suggested, should solicit funding to promote training for their own personnel.

Some argued that NGO/IOs operate much better in non-conflict settings—as demonstrated by relief efforts following the recent tsunami that struck South and Southeast Asia. Interestingly, others cited this same example to counter that the *military* is much better at providing humanitarian assistance in non-conflict zones.

At this point participants were reminded again that definitions are important, and that many situations labeled "humanitarian assistance" are, in fact, not. Another participant, though agreeing the term is used too broadly, warned against the group coming up with its own definitions "here and now."

The pre- and post-9/11 dividing line was raised again, with the comment that before September 11, 2001, the US Defense Department wanted as much as possible to outsource humanitarian assistance to other agencies (e.g., USAID), but now recognizes that it sometimes has to be involved in such assistance activities.

A complicating factor in providing assistance in conflict zones, noted one participant, is that combat, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities are all taking place at the same time--creating a need for simultaneous operations, with all of the challenges associated therein.

The increasing role played by private contracting companies was briefly discussed, with one participant noting that contractors are encroaching on the role traditionally played by NGO/IOs--but are motivated by profit as the reason for doing so.

Civil-Military Cooperation in the wake of the Asian tsunami

Photo: US Department of Defense

V. Coordination and Information Sharing

The discussion about providing assistance evolved into discussions about and suggestions for coordination and information sharing.

While some participants stressed the need for and desirability of increased cooperation, coordination and information sharing, others maintained that there should not be closer ties between humanitarian actors and military forces.

There are well developed standards for cooperation, coordination and information sharing used by some humanitarian actors, and participants urged that these standards be discussed, distributed and adopted by all organizations participating in the delivery of humanitarian assistance—including NGO/IOs and military forces. It was further noted that while it is important for organizations delivering aid to abide by these standards, it is equally important for donors to be aware of them and to direct funding to the organizations that abide by them.

One participant noted that there are currently over 800 NGOs operating in Afghanistan, which, it was asserted, is simply too many. Under such circumstances, the participant argued, the diversity of actors with different goals,

guidelines and operational methods creates a situation of confusion and, ultimately, insecurity. A certification process based on specific standards—to include local participation, motivations and delivery methods--would facilitate coordinating and improving both the delivery of services and security for the individuals involved in providing them.

Agreeing, another participant stated, "It is not enough simply to have the *ability* to deliver humanitarian assistance; there must also be a certain level of quality control."

Taking issue with the idea of standards and certification, one participant noted that NGO/IOs are made up of diverse individuals operating under a range of motivations, and that they are not "standard."

While this may be true, countered another participant, there are still advantages to adopting certain codes of conduct for NGO/IOs operating in specific situations. For example, there could be certain codes for a particular country, or codes of conduct for operating in conflict zones. Again, these standards could improve the quality of services provided and help to improve the image of the NGO/IO community, which could, in turn, positively affect NGO/IO security concerns.

Another participant, noting that the discussion was focusing almost exclusively on NGO/IOs, asked how it could be applied to the military? In response, it was suggested that military forces involved in providing humanitarian assistance could adopt many of the standards used by NGOs. Further, stated another participant, NGO/IO guidelines could help the military understand who its potential partners are and how they operate.

Returning to the issue of funding, a concern was raised over unrestricted funding versus money earmarked for specific objectives—such as tsunami relief—once again highlighting the importance of donor cooperation in any attempts at standardization.

This sparked discussion on peacekeeping and policing activities, and on the value and feasibility of coordination in this area. Conflict prevention was cited as a critical component of stabilization as well as an opportunity for collaboration. It was suggested, for example, that the US Government could help the African Union with policing efforts in the Darfur region of Sudan. There was general agreement that it would be feasible and beneficial to establish a policing

curriculum, with joint training exercises and clearly defined and established partners, including indigenous staff.

If NGO/IO representatives are included in crisis-response training, stated one participant, when a crisis hits, they can more realistically be expected to take the lead in dealing with it.

Another participant responded, "Yes, but all of this—operational standards and closer cooperation—is already widely recognized as being important. Just look at the initiatives already developed. These ideas are not new, nor are they implemented. Why not, and how can we convince people to implement them now? What's changed?"

World views and realities are quickly changing in the post-cold war, post-9/11 world. In 2001, the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, responding to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's request for a study, released the report *The Responsibility to Protect* advocating a human security agenda and humanitarian intervention when warranted (see http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp).

There were also some practical ideas about how to increase collaboration between NGO/IOs, military forces and government officials. For example, guides should be produced categorizing NGO/IOs by type as well as by function and regional areas of expertise. Even better, stated one participant, would be a dynamic website that could be easily accessed and updated. It was noted that in some cases this is already being done. For example, the US Institute of Peace has published *Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations*, and is working on an updated version.

While there was some concern over how such a guide would be used (with NGOs expressing concern over the idea of military officers viewing them as "force multipliers"), there was also a lot of support for the idea.

Finally, as the day's discussions were coming to an end, it was noted that this workshop itself was providing a valuable opportunity for people to come together to share their organizational perspectives, guidelines and goals. As enhanced information sharing was a major recommendation of the day, the session concluded with a strong sense of focus, accomplishment and understanding of the challenges involved in providing humanitarian assistance.

Peter Walker, Director of the Feinstein International Famine Institute at Tufts University, facilitated the workshop discussions

Miguel Tirado, CSU Monterey Bay, Leslie Curtin, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and LTC Christopher Holschek, US Army Civil Affairs, discuss the different security challenges faced by various actors in the field of humanitarian assistance

Matthew Vaccaro, Program Director, Nicholas Tomb, Program Coordinator, Dr. Karen Guttieri, Academic Advisor and John Christiansen, Program Coordinator at the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies

Matthew Vaccaro of the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies and Anne Richard of the International Rescue Committee

Julia Taft of the UN Development Program and Leslie Curtin of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Workshop organizers at the end of a long but successful day

LTC Christopher Holschek, US Army Civil Affairs and Michael Dziedzic, United States Institute of Peace

Roy Williams of the Center for Humanitarian Cooperation

Workshop Discussions: Day Two

Breakout Groups

On day two, workshop participants divided into breakout groups to discuss the following issues:

- There are different conceptions of humanitarian space and "humanitarians." What are the key typologies of humanitarians? How should these types relate to local community and military actors?

- The inability to provide physical security because of gaps in the rule of law, economic rehabilitation and governance compromises humanitarian action. What is the role of humanitarians and others in bridging this gap?

- What is out there in terms of codes, best practices, lessons learned and professional capacity building? How can these most effectively be shared and understood among humanitarian and military actors?

The breakout groups presented the following conclusions:

Definitions:

Humanitarian Space: "A safe and secure environment in which to provide impartial assistance and protection."

Humanitarian: "A person or organization delivering assistance to someone in need with impartiality in execution (in addition to neutrality in planning)."



Figure 1: Humanitarian Space: Organizations seeking "humanitarian space" depend upon neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to achieve acceptance by local populations and security within insecure environments. The International Committee of the Red Cross was presented as an organization that is commonly viewed as meeting all three criteria.



Figure 2: How, When and Why NGO/IOs Get Involved in Providing Humanitarian Assistance: The different motivations that organizations have for getting involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance can be explained according to the factors described in this figure.

	Humanitarian	Human Rights	Development	Civil Society
International National Indigenous				

Figure 3: Types of NGO/IOs: NGO/IOs can be categorized according to their geographical origin and the type of work they do, as in the above chart.

Presentations focused on the following topics and made the following suggestions:

Delivery Gaps Affecting Security

Planners need to take into account *all* elements of security, including human security, before intervening. These include concern for:

- Organizations delivering humanitarian assistance
- Nations
- Non-combatants
- The public (e.g., the rule of law, courts, prisons, jobs)
- Economic development
- Political freedoms
- Combatants

There are different views of security, including physical, psychological, international, local, and community perceptions. Who does this analysis? When do they do it? How do they do it? The answers to these questions are critical to getting a realistic assessment of the security situation, and would be best addressed by teams made up of diverse regional experts who could examine individual environments.

NGO/IOs can affect the public, economic and political security arenas and should be integrated into planning for interventions (including pre-, during and post-conflict planning and operations).

Roles of NGO/IOs in Filling Security Gaps

1. NGO/IOs can address force protection needs for themselves.

2. NGO/IOs can advocate with interveners to create/stabilize the security environment for their clients/beneficiaries.

3. Organizations involved in providing humanitarian assistance should create an ongoing Terms of Reference process, with information sharing and cooperation/coordination.

The challenge is to ascertain how NGO/IOs can work with the military to fill delivery gaps without losing their identity as impartial and neutral actors. Overcoming this challenge could help to legitimize humanitarian goals.

Conclusions: Next Steps

Recent trends suggest that the global community's commitment to assistance in the face of complex humanitarian emergencies will remain strong. However, the security threats facing aid workers will be challenging, with a strong possibility of things getting worse before they get better.

It is critical, therefore, that those involved in delivering humanitarian aid have a reasonable understanding of who their counterparts are and how they operate. As highlighted in the workshop survey results, when and where it is feasible information regarding delivery operations, security threats and humanitarian conditions should be shared among humanitarian organizations. Doing so will enhance the ability to provide for civilian populations, while making the delivery of assistance safer for aid workers.

In closing remarks, a number of participants noted the "value of dialogue." The workshop was "an end in its own right," they asserted, as it promoted dialogue among many major actors involved in providing humanitarian assistance -- a recommendation loudly voiced in both this strategic workshop and in previous conferences and publications, including the recent PKSOI Carlisle Conference and the USIP Special Report on Provisional Reconstruction Teams, which were cited at the workshop. (See Appendix).

It was agreed that the workshop had been valuable, and that participants now had a better understanding of the diverse actors involved in humanitarian assistance.

While the diversity of the group prevented the development of a single, uniform road map for future action, participants remained committed to future discussions on the roles of humanitarians in insecure environments.

Additionally, the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies agreed to expand on the list of codes of conduct developed at the workshop, further compiling the operational guidelines used by organizations involved in humanitarian assistance and posting them on its website (http://www.csrs-nps.org) in the near future.

Finally, workshop participants made the following recommendations:

- Create *clear* and *agreed upon* operational definitions (of "security," "humanitarian assistance," "humanitarian relief," etc.).

- Establish a process for integrating NGO/IO input and communication into planning pre-/during/post-conflict.

- Incorporate existing operational guidelines for humanitarian assistance (such as those developed by UNOCHA) into DoD operations.

- Create a regular forum for understanding how various actors operate in similar environments, and mechanisms for capturing "institutional memories" and organizational changes.

- Create an on-line library for cataloging NGOs, including their operational guidelines, activities and expertise.

- Continue interactions among the various actors, including dialogue and possible joint training exercises.

Appendices

Appendix I: Workshop Agenda

Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments

United States Institute of Peace
1200 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036

AGENDA

Thursday, January 13, 2005

9-9:30	Welcome and Introductions (Charla Britt, Miguel Tirado, Matt Vaccaro, Roy Williams)
9:30-10:15	Analysis of Survey Results (led by Karen Guttieri and Miguel Tirado)
10:15-10:45	Coffee Break
10:45-12	Discussion: "Survey Results" (facilitated by Peter Walker)
12-1	Working Lunch, Discussion Continues
1-3	Discussion Continues
3-3:30	Coffee Break
3:30-4:30	Summary of Day's Discussion and Structure of Day Two (Peter Walker)

Friday, January 14, 2005

9-9:45	Review Day One and Goals of Day Two (Peter Walker)
9:45-10	Coffee Break
10-11:30	Breakout Groups to Draft Short Statements on Topics to be Included in Statement of Conference Conclusions
11:30-1	Finalize Statement of Conference Conclusions in Plenary

The Professional Training Program of the United States Institute of Peace expresses its appreciation to The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for its support of this meeting.

Appendix II: Workshop Survey

This is a preliminary survey to identify issues and needs to be addressed at the upcoming workgroup meeting planned for January.

1. What is your position in your organization?

   _____

2. Describe some of the particularly new or different challenges your organization faces in any post-conflict field operation involving multiple actors.

3. How would you characterize the status of your organization's overall relationship with each of the following major actors? Please identify with a check where you are on the following chart using the 6 levels of interaction below.

   - Awareness: cognizant of the other's presence in your field of operations
   - Familiarity: knowledgeable of the other's activities and methods of operation
   - Boundary setting: seek to mutually clarify parameters of operation to avoid disruption of one another's mission
   - Cooperation: mutual accommodation for separate missions including information exchange
   - Collaboration: working in distinct operating teams toward a common outcome based on a shared situational understanding
   - Partnership: mixing operational units together to work toward a common goal

Levels of Interaction	Intern. NGOs	Local NGOs	US Military	Local authorities	Private contractors	UN/IOs
Awareness						
Familiarity						
Boundary setting						
Cooperation						
Collaboration						
Partnership						

4. Please identify with an asterisk (*) on the above chart where you would like that relationship to be for each actor.

5. How would you characterize the quality of your organization's overall relationship with each of the following major actors? Please indicate with a number from 1 to 5 what the quality of your interaction is, with 1 being very poor and 5 being excellent.

International NGOs	Local NGOs	UN/IOs	US Military	Local authorities	Private contractors	

6. Which of the following descriptors apply to your organization? (check all that apply)

    a. Faith-based
    b. Advocacy
    c. Emergency relief
    d. Rehabilitation
    e. Reconstruction
    f. Primarily privately funded
    g. Primarily government funded

7. What, in your mind, are the most urgent points of mutual concern with other organizations in post-conflict and relief settings? (rank in order; 1 is most important)

__Logistics
__Security for personnel
__Competition for local labor / transport / housing
__Local public awareness
__Sectoral convergence (e.g., health, water sanitation, education)
__Other_____

8. To what extent do you observe host communities in post-conflict environments have difficulty distinguishing your identity and mission from those of the other major foreign actors in their country?

Never	Seldom	Sometimes	Often	Consistently
1	2	3	4	5

9. If so, what effect will your response to the previous question have on the management approach to your operations in the country?

10. Please add any additional comments:

Appendix III: Dr. Karen Guttieri's Survey Summary:
"Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments: Response to a Survey"

Karen Guttieri
Naval Postgraduate School
Guttieri@nps.edu

Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments: Response to a Survey

…when the profession can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the existing tradition of scientific practice – then begin the extraordinary investigations that lead the profession at last to a new set of commitments, a new basis for the practice of science.

Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*

A paradigm shift is taking place in the world of humanitarians. It is evident in the political contest over a very basic concept of *humanitarian space*. As defined by the European Commission's Directorate for Humanitarian Aid, "humanitarian space" means "the access and freedom for humanitarian organisations to assess and meet humanitarian needs." Humanitarian principles, including humanity (preserving the humanitarian nature of operations), independence from political and military actors, impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination, are essential to humanitarian actors. However, at least since agents of violence in African refugee camps exploited humanitarian impulses in the 1990s, challenges to these principles have arisen in humanitarian practice. Compromised neutrality, seemingly regardless of humanitarian intentions and stemming from simply being "outsiders," changes relationships with communities, political and military actors, and degrades physical security. A humanitarian paradigm shift, as with changes in the practice of science described by Kuhn, first involves recognition of anomalies and second, new investigations upon which to build a new basis for practice. This is the point of departure for our inquiry.

It is clear today that the theoretical space that insulates aid workers is physically increasingly unsafe. In 2003, there were more fatal attacks on humanitarian workers than previously recorded.[2] Terrorist attacks in recent years increasingly

[1] According to World Vision data derived from various reports (Dennis Klug, UN Security coordinator), most attack fatalities in the period 1997-2003 resulted from ambush (127) and murder (72). Car/truck bombing (26), landmines (25), anti-aircraft attack (24), and aerial bombardment (14) were also significant. There were more than 70 violent deaths in 2003, doubling the number in 2002. More than half of the

targeted United Nations and non-governmental organizations. The destruction in Iraq of the UN Headquarters in August 2003, including the death of Special Representative Sergio de Mello, shocked the world. Gil Loscher was in de Mello's office at the time of the explosion and lost two legs and friends in the blast. He wrote later of the difficult position of the UN and called for a clear separation of military and humanitarian activity.[3] In Afghanistan in June 2004, the murder of five Medicin Sans Frontieres personnel caused MSF to withdraw after more than 24 years of service there. MSF departed with a closing salvo against the military for blurring the boundaries of humanitarian space by directly delivering aid. The brutal kidnapping in October 2004 and eventual murder of Margaret Hassan, Director of CARE International Iraq, was particularly astonishing because she had long lived among and cared for the Iraqi people. In response, Peter Walker of the Feinstein International Famine Center at Tufts University called for a reinvention of humanitarianism. Walker calls for a global movement that articulates "a value set and doctrine that resonates across all cultures" at the same time he urges a more localized approach that puts local agencies out front.[4]

The paradigm of security for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) differs from that of military and corporate approaches. If the military approach to force protection is primarily *deterrence*, and the corporate approach is *protection* (for example, hiring bodyguards), the NGO approach has been characterized by *acceptance*. This model, writes one participant in our workshop, may not be holding as "NGOs have become prime targets due to their proximity to the conflict." These organizations have customarily accepted the risk associated with their work, but now question whether the security provided by regional governments is sufficient. There is debate today about what is an acceptable level of risk, with different organizations setting different thresholds.[5]

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victims are local (not expatriate) staff. Angola (58), Afghanistan (36) and Iraq (32) led the list of the highest number of aid workers killed in this period. This data needs more investigation: does it include UN workers? Is it important to control for the level of crime and, if so, how does one account for it? If humanitarian aid is a growth industry, how does one control for the number of violent deaths in relation to a growing number of aid workers?

[2] Gil Loscher, "An Idea Lost in the Rubble," *The New York Times* August 20, 2004.

[3] Peter Walker, "Hassan Murder Engenders Soul-searching," AlertNet December 13, 2004. Tanja Hohe and Jarat Chopra similarly argue for giving local voices more influence in the development of the state, even allowing for indigenous paradigms to linger alongside modern forms, in "Participatory Intervention," *Global Governance* 10, no. 3 (2004). [Available online at: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/109847/SD_Communication/epublish/zip_files/tslg/pdf/intervention.pdf.]

[4] World Vision has developed *The World Vision Reporter* to gather information from field security officers in order to assign risk scores to areas of operation. This system rates countries as red, yellow or green. When Colombia was reported as green, in contrast to what the head office knows to be true, it became

Meanwhile, humanitarian agencies have conducted research and developed programs to address the problem of safety for their personnel.[6]

Interaction between humanitarians and militaries had deepened over the last decade to include formalized exchanges, coordination, and institutional development of centers and institutes. Indeed, an emergent consensus on coherence – coordination of intervention and humanitarian actions – was emerging by the turn of the millennium. The United Nations became a fulcrum for external assistance in its many forms, in an implicit division of labor among military peacekeepers and civilian government and non-government agencies. However, the cohesiveness of the relationship and possibility for advancement appear doubtful in the wake of interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.[7] Although civil-military relations are vital to effective post-conflict transitions, these relations have been strained by more aggressive and contested interventions.

Mapping Relationships

In preparation for our working session on humanitarian roles in dangerous environments, we constructed a survey of NGO, government, military, international and academic professionals who would participate. This survey seeks to identify and map the relationships among various stakeholders in relief and reconstruction scenarios, account for effects of recent experience on these relationships, and better understand the organizational approaches of humanitarian agencies to the challenges of security. This small survey was not intended as a scientific instrument, but as a point of departure for discussion among an elite group of experienced practitioners. Of the 22 surveys distributed, we received 20 responses.

We asked, "What are the most urgent points of concern with other organizations in post-conflict and relief settings?" Three challenges were in the top of nearly every list:

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obvious that some field workers become acclimated to danger. Another challenge to objective reporting is donor refusal to fund dangerous environments, making staff reluctant to admit dangers or to pull out. Alternatively, in some cases local workers have felt the need to move even when head office does not declare a need to move, as happened in Sierra Leone.

[5] Some examples from a large and growing literature include the following: European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) *Report on Security of Humanitarian Personnel: Standards and Practices for the Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Advocacy for Humanitarian Space* 2004; *Generic Security Guide* and *Security Training Directory*; "Workshop on Common Operational Guidelines, Institute for Defense Analysis" 25 October 2001.

[6] Andjela Jurisic, *The Liaison* 2004.

1. Security for personnel
2. Information sharing
3. Local public awareness

Staff recruiting and training; donor issues, in particular, US Government expectations; program monitoring and evaluation; and logistical and communication barriers to cooperation were also prominently mentioned.

When we asked about new or different challenges in the field, the threat of indiscriminate attack, including abduction and assassination, was frequently identified. It is noteworthy that information sharing is a prominent concern. One participant remarked that "better clarity and more systematic and focused effort to communicate purpose by all organizations operating in an emergency can help improve collaboration without abrogating the organization's key principles or protocols." Is there a linkage between interoperability and improved security? It appears from the responses that NGO workers are encountering the military more intimately than desired, while the military finds itself expected to do things it is unprepared for. Many respondents noted the involvement of more types of actors in "nation building" as new or different. Finally, there was much concern about a new or different challenge of "blurring lines" between humanitarian actors on the one hand and the political and military on the other. The emphasis on local public awareness when asked about prominent concerns speaks to the problem of differentiation, but may also indicate increasing cultural challenges in the field.

In seeking to understand the relationships, we asked about current level of interaction with other types of actors and desired level of interaction. These appear as a hierarchical range of interaction as follows:

Type of Interaction	**Description**
Conflictive	Unproductive disputes
Dismissive	The other party or actor discounts your role
Awareness	Cognizant of each other's presence in field
Familiarity	Knowledgeable of the other's activities and methods
Boundary setting	Mutually clarify parameters of operation to avoid disruption of one another's mission
Cooperative	Mutual accommodation for separate missions including information exchange
Collaborative	Distinct operating teams / work towards common outcome based on shared situational understanding
Partnership	mix operational units / work toward a common goal

We coded 9 of our respondents as non-governmental. Separately, we asked about the quality of interaction. Those responses appear as follows:

NGO Interactions

With Whom	Interaction [desired]	Quality
IO	Collaborative-partnership	High
Local NGO	Cooperative	High
Int'l NGO	Cooperative [seek collaborative]	Medium
Local Authorities	Boundary setting [often seek cooperation]	Medium
Military	Boundary setting	Low-Medium
Contractors	Familiar [seek cooperation]	Low

In contrast, US Government and Military responses were more sanguine, as follows:

US Government and Military Relationships

With Whom	Interaction [desired]	Quality
IO	Cooperative-Partnership	Medium-High
Local NGO	Cooperative	Medium
Int'l NGO	Cooperative	Medium-Low
Local Authorities	Cooperative	Medium
Contractors	Familiar – Cooperative	Medium

Many NGO responses discussed how very critical host country perceptions are in their work. "Without strong local bonds and buy-in from the community our work is not tenable," wrote one participant. "Security is a major concern when perception is incorrect," wrote another. One participant wrote, "The military is dismissive of NGOs and delving ever deeper into humanitarian programming. The US Government is obsessed with "owning" the NGOs through rhetoric ("force multipliers"), actions (contracts vs. grants), and sanctions (prohibiting even emergency humanitarian assistance through OFAC licensing)." For its part, the US Department of Defense describes desire to transition as quickly as possible from humanitarian operations, so must sustain good relations with humanitarian organizations. For the US DOD, host nation perceptions are also critical, as the DOD only participates "with the approval of host nation authorities." Civilian government agencies likewise seek to "work closely with and empower if possible local communities." The need to manage tension among external agents of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping was noted by many: "When we begin to perceive our work as a competition for precious resources, we become more like the ruthless demagogues that promote these conflicts."

Appendix IV: Workshop Participants

1. COL John Agoglia, US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
2. George Biddle, International Rescue Committee
3. Charla Britt, Monterey Institute of International Studies
4. Scott Busby, State Department Bureau of Population Refugees and Migration
5. John Christiansen, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, Naval Postgraduate School
6. Leslie Curtin, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
7. Beth DeGrasse, United States Institute of Peace
8. Michael Dziedzic, United States Institute of Peace
9. Gene Dewey, State Department Bureau of Pop. Refugees and Migration
10. Karen Guttieri, Naval Postgraduate School
11. Todd Harvey, Office of the Secretary of Defense: Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
12. LTC Christopher Holschek, US Army Civil Affairs
13. Noor Kirdar, United States Institute of Peace
14. Lana Lynn, Consultant on Humanitarian Affairs
15. Gerard McHugh, Conflict Dynamics/Save the Children UK
16. Debbie Merrill, Office of US Congressman Sam Farr
17. Michael Neuman, Medicins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders)
18. Robert Perito, United States Institute of Peace
19. Kathryn Poethig, California State University, Monterey Bay
20. Anne Richard, International Rescue Committee
21. Finn Ruda, International Committee of the Red Cross
22. Michael Seidl, United States Institute of Peace
23. Julia Taft, UN Development Program
24. Miguel Tirado, California State University, Monterey Bay
25. Nicholas Tomb, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, Naval Postgraduate School
26. Stephen Tomlin, International Medical Corps
27. Matthew Vaccaro, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, Naval Postgraduate School
28. Ann Vaughan, Office of US Congressman Sam Farr
29. Peter Walker, Tufts University (Facilitator)
30. Roy Williams, Center for Humanitarian Cooperation

Appendix V: Co-Sponsoring Organizations

California State University, Monterey Bay

California State University, Monterey Bay (CSUMB) is a comprehensive state university that values service through high quality education. The university is distinctive in serving the diverse people of California, especially the working class and historically undereducated and low-income populations. It features an enriched living and learning environment and year-round operation.

The identity of the university is framed by substantive commitment to multilingual, multicultural, gender-equitable learning. The university is a collaborative intellectual community distinguished by partnerships with existing institutions, both public and private; cooperative agreements that enable students, faculty, and staff to cross institutional boundaries for innovative instruction; broadly defined scholarly and creative activity; and coordinated community service.

Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies

The Naval Postgraduate School created the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) in September 2004. The new Center is dedicated to building more effective responses to failing states and ungoverned spaces.

The Center provides short- and long-term graduate education, creates knowledge through research and conducts educational outreach in the broad functional areas of stability and reconstruction.

The best learning in this field occurs when the curriculum is multidisciplinary and interactive among a diverse student mix. The programs of CSRS incorporate students from the complete range of actors involved in these activities, including US and foreign military officers, US and foreign government civilians and civilians from international organizations and non-governmental organizations.

Center for Humanitarian Cooperation

The Center for Humanitarian Cooperation, a not-for-profit organization, was created to assist the international humanitarian community in developing models for greater cooperation.

The Center consists of a devoted and experienced group of professionals. It serves as a neutral party to foster functional cooperation among the growing group of organizations concerned with humanitarian issues.

International Medical Corps

The International Medical Corps is a global humanitarian nonprofit organization dedicated to saving lives and relieving suffering through health care training and relief and development programs.

Established in 1984 by volunteer doctors and nurses, IMC is a private, voluntary, nonpolitical, nonsectarian organization. Its mission is to improve the quality of life through health interventions and related activities that build local capacity in areas worldwide where few organizations dare to serve. By offering training and health care to local populations and medical assistance to people at highest risk, and with the flexibility to respond rapidly to emergency situations, IMC rehabilitates devastated health care systems and helps bring them back to self reliance.

International Rescue Committee

Founded in 1933, the International Rescue Committee is a world leader in relief, rehabilitation, protection, post-conflict development, resettlement services and advocacy for those uprooted or affected by violent conflict and oppression.

At work in 25 countries, the IRC delivers lifesaving aid in emergencies; rebuilds shattered communities; cares for war-traumatized children; rehabilitates health care, water and sanitation systems; reunites separated families; restores lost livelihoods; establishes schools; trains teachers; strengthens the capacity of local organizations; and supports civil society and good-governance initiatives.

For refugees afforded sanctuary in the United States, IRC offices across the country provide a range of assistance aimed at helping new arrivals get settled, adjust, and acquire the skills to become self sufficient.

Committed to restoring dignity and self-reliance, the IRC is a global symbol of hope and renewal for those who have taken flight in search of freedom.

Monterey Institute of International Studies

With approximately 750 students and 70 full-time resident faculty, the Institute is a close-knit, welcoming community. Faculty and staff are readily available to meet with students, and students themselves are eager to share their experiences. Most students and faculty have studied or worked abroad and are receptive to new people and new views. Amidst the stunning physical beauty of the central California coast, this atmosphere of openness and active connection with the environment is a dimension of the Monterey experience that remains with Institute graduates for many years.

Consisting of four separate but interconnected graduate schools, the Institute provides a practical curriculum with particular emphasis on languages and cross-cultural communication designed to prepare students for professional careers in the fields of their choosing.

United States Institute of Peace

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by Congress to promote the prevention, management and peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including research grants, fellowships, professional training, education programs from high school through graduate school, conferences and workshops, library services and publications. The Institute's Board of Directors is appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Appendix VI: US Institute of Peace Special Report: *Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations* Recommendations

In April 2004 the United States Institute of Peace published a Special Report examining civilian capacity in US stability operations. The report examined the requirements for the US Government to develop a civilian capacity to deploy police, judges and corrections officials to peace and stability operations.

Ambassador Robert Gelbard, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Ambassador Robert Oakley, former State Department Coordinator for Counter-terrorism; and General Anthony Zinni, former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, served as advisors for the report.

The report was written by Robert Perito, Special Advisor to the Rule of Law Program; Michael Dziedzic, a Program Officer in the Institute's Research and Studies Program and the strategic planner who drafted the Mission Implementation Plan for the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and the Standards for Kosovo for the UN Mission in Kosovo; and Beth C. DeGrasse, Executive Director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

The following recommendations from the USIP Special Report were reported at the "Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments" workshop:

- There is a need to promote a better understanding of humanitarian providers' norms and imperatives within the military community.
- We need to establish a process for inputting the humanitarian community's feedback to update military doctrine/training.
- Major IOs and NGOs need to establish liaisons in regional Command headquarters prior to military operations.
- The military should adapt classification procedures for information sharing with IOs and NGOs.

Appendix VII: US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute Coordination Conference, December 13 – 14, 2004 Recommendations

On December 13 - 14, 2004, the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (USAPKSOI), the State Department's Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) hosted a stability operations symposium designed to enable collective solutions to the challenges confronting the United States Government's stability operations.

The event was held at the Center for Strategic Leadership at the US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference's theme "Where We Are and the Road Ahead," provided a meaningful opportunity for agencies and organizations involved in stability operations to share experiences and lessons learned, and to inform other conference participants of their capabilities and current and planned activities.

The following findings and recommendations from the PKSOI conference were reported at the "Humanitarian Roles in Insecure Environments" workshop:

- A glossary of common key terms is essential for successful understanding, collaboration and information sharing among members of the stability operations community.
- Interagency participation in the military's stability operations planning is required, and a useful template and cooperative mechanism that would improve interagency planning should be developed.
- Additionally, increased interagency and NGO/IO participation must become standard in the combatant commands' training and exercises.
- Ownership of and local participation in the crisis response strategy must be a part of any stabilization and reconstruction solution.
- More attention must be devoted to measuring success in stability operations, and a need exists for a system of metrics to assist in the evaluation and validation of reconstruction and stabilization missions.
- A central venue for collection, integration and dissemination of policy, planning and operational lessons learned related to post-conflict operations should be created.

Appendix VIII: Day Two Working Group Presentation
"Existing Codes of Conduct/Best Practices"

International

1. European Commission on Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) Guidelines (http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/index_en.htm)

2. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
   On-site Coordination Office Guidelines
   (www.reliefweb.int/symposium/bp_statement.html)

3. UN Best Practices website
   (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/)

4. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations:
   In process of developing UN-centric guidelines

5. Oslo Plus (Guidelines)
   (http://ochaonline.un.org/GetBin.asp?DocID=426)

6. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
   (http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/)

US

1. Military Doctrine (Inconsistent and Ad-hoc)
   a. War Colleges, Military School, pre-deployment education, "just-in-time training"

NGOs

1. "Sphere" codes (minimal levels of care)
   (http://www.sphereproject.org/links.htm)

   a. Define the role and minimal level of competence desired of agencies involved in humanitarian assistance

   b. Standards by sector

        i. Medical
        ii. Nutritional
2. French NGO Equivalent (Project Compass)

3. Codes of Conduct
    a. US Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration: Requirements for Grantees (created in Africa in early 2000s)

    b. International Rescue Committee Code of Conduct for Staff

    c. IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) includes:
        i. Major UN agencies
        ii. ICRC
        iii. NGO coalitions
4. Safety
    a. IMC/World Vision, etc.

    b. InterAction DVD on security

    c. European NGOs
        i. Register of Engineers
            1. Generic training package for NGOs

    d. Guidelines on use of armed escorts

    e. Evacuation protocols

    f. Hostage taking